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INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL: A LEGAL ARGUMENT
FOR ENDING PRIVATE FEDERAL PRISONS AND
DETENTION CENTERS†
ABSTRACT
Under the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 1998, the
federal government’s “inherently governmental functions” must be performed
by government actors, while its “commercial activities” may be performed by
private contractors. This statute has important implications for the legality of
privately operated federal prisons and immigration detention centers. If
operating prisons and detention centers is an inherently governmental function
within the meaning of the FAIR Act, then these facilities cannot be operated by
private contractors. This Comment provides a comprehensive legal analysis of
whether the operation of prison and detention facilities is an inherently
governmental function.
Federal government policy recognizes two tests for identifying inherently
governmental functions. First, under the “exercise of discretion” test, a
function is inherently governmental if it involves exercising discretion in
applying government authority. Second, under the “nature of the function”
test, a function is inherently governmental if it involves exercising the
sovereign powers of the United States. This Comment argues that operating
prison and detention facilities is an inherently governmental function under
either test. It is inherently governmental under the exercise of discretion test
because private prison contractors, in applying the government’s authority to
incarcerate people, exercise discretion with significant consequences for
prison conditions and inmates’ liberties. Further, imprisonment is also an
inherently governmental function under the nature of the function test because
its legitimacy rests on the sovereign power to deprive a person of liberty in the
name of law enforcement, public safety, or border control. Thus, the operation
of prison and detention facilities is an inherently governmental function that
cannot legally be contracted out to the private sector.
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INTRODUCTION
In February 2017, Attorney General Jefferson Sessions reversed the Obama
Administration’s plan to phase out federal government contracting with private
prison companies.1 Under President Obama, the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) decided to phase out private prison contracts because it found that
private prisons are less safe, less secure, and roughly equal in cost as compared
to government facilities.2 The Trump Administration, by contrast, maintains
that private prisons are effective and will be necessary “to meet the future
needs of the federal correctional system.”3 Both administrations have framed
the issue of prison privatization in empirical terms—focusing on costs, prison
conditions, or the size of the prison population—rather than in legal or moral
terms.
Independent of the Obama Administration’s contested empirical
conclusions about private prisons,4 this Comment argues there is a legal reason
to end private prison contracting at the federal level. Under the Federal
Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 1998, the federal government
cannot contract out “inherently governmental functions” for performance by
the private sector.5 The FAIR Act defines inherently governmental function as
“a function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to require
performance by Federal Government employees.”6 If prison operation is an

1
Eric Lichtblau, Justice Department Keeps For-Profit Prisons, Scrapping an Obama Plan, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/us/politics/justice-department-private-prisons.
html; see Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the Acting Dir.,
Fed. Bureau of Prisons (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/file/886311/download
[hereinafter Yates Memorandum].
2
See Yates Memorandum, supra note 1.
3
Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions III, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the Acting Dir.,
Fed. Bureau of Prisons (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.bop.gov/resources/news/pdfs/20170224_doj_memo.pdf;
see also John Burnett, Will the Private Prison Business See a Trump Bump?, NPR (Jan. 4, 2017, 4:58 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2017/01/04/508048666/will-the-private-prison-business-see-a-trump-bump
(quoting
President Trump’s statement that privatization of prisons “seems to work a lot better”).
4
Cost comparison studies and data on the quality of confinement in public and private prisons have
provoked debate among policymakers and scholars alike. See DOUGLAS MCDONALD ET AL., PRIVATE PRISONS
IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICE 33–46 (1998); Brad W. Lundahl et al., Prison
Privatization: A Meta-Analysis of Cost and Quality of Confinement Indicators, 19 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC.
383, 392–93 (2009); Matthew D. Makarios & Jeff Maahs, Is Private Time Quality Time? A National PrivatePublic Comparison of Prison Quality, 92 PRISON J. 336, 337 (2012); Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the
Elusive Employee-Contractor Distinction, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 144 (2012) (“It is . . . not surprising to
find that many of these [anti-privatization] arguments are deeply contested, because they depend on messy
data and contingent facts.”).
5
31 U.S.C. § 501 note (2012) (Federal Activities Inventory Reform).
6
Id.
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inherently governmental function, then prison privatization violates the FAIR
Act.
Whether the operation of prison and detention facilities is an inherently
governmental function within the meaning of the FAIR Act is an important,
but neglected, question. The administrative designation of this function matters
because recognizing prison and detention services as an inherently
governmental function would require the DOJ to reverse its current policy and
put an end to contracting for these services at the federal level.7 Furthermore,
reclassifying this function would bar private contracting for detention services
not only by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), but also by other federal
agencies such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Although the
civil detention of immigrants based on their citizenship status can be
distinguished conceptually from corrections, this distinction has become
blurred: unauthorized immigration is increasingly prosecuted as a criminal
act,8 and immigration detainees are treated like prisoners.9 Because criminal
incarceration and immigration detention both manifest the government’s power
to deprive a person of liberty in the name of law enforcement, raise
overlapping concerns, and are treated as a single category for purposes of
federal procurement policy,10 this Comment’s argument applies to both prisons
and immigration detention centers.
Neither scholars nor courts have provided a comprehensive legal analysis
of whether imprisonment is an inherently governmental function under the
FAIR Act. Some scholars have argued that prison management cannot
legitimately be delegated to the private sector because of its inherently
governmental nature, but they have generally framed this argument in
philosophical or moral, rather than legal, terms.11 A few scholars have noted
7
The DOJ under President Obama proposed to do this by “directing that, as each contract reaches the
end of its term, the Bureau should either decline to renew that contract or substantially reduce its scope in a
manner consistent with law and the overall decline of the Bureau’s inmate population.” Yates Memorandum,
supra note 1.
8
See Investigation into Private Prisons Reveals Crowding, Under-Staffing and Inmate Deaths, NPR
(Aug. 25, 2016, 3:03 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/08/25/491340335/investigation-into-private-prisonsreveals-crowding-under-staffing-and-inmate-de.
9
Subhash Kateel & Aarti Shahani, Families for Freedom: Against Deportation and Delegalization, in
KEEPING OUT THE OTHER: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT TODAY 258, 263–64
(David C. Brotherton & Philip Kretsedemas eds., 2008).
10
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-76
REVISED, PERFORMANCE OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES (2003) (clarifying that the Circular does not prevent
contracting out for “the operation of prison or detention facilities”).
11
See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 446 n.19
(2005) (examining prison privatization from the perspective of liberal legitimacy in contrast to the inherent-
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that the FAIR Act can be interpreted to bar private federal prisons, but have not
developed this argument fully.12 Courts have not had occasion to consider
whether the operation of prison and detention facilities is an inherently
governmental function under the FAIR Act, as the ability to challenge an
agency’s designation is limited by the statute’s “interested party” standing
requirements.13 This Comment seeks to provide a comprehensive legal analysis
of whether the operation of prison and detention facilities is an inherently
governmental function within the meaning of the FAIR Act.
Whether the FAIR Act bars private prison and detention facilities hinges
on an ambiguous term. The statutory definition of the term inherently
governmental function—a “function that is so intimately related to the public
interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees”14—is
far from self-explanatory. It raises fundamental questions about the proper
roles of government and the private sector in American society.15
To clarify the federal government’s outsourcing policy, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) established two tests for identifying
inherently governmental functions: (1) the “exercise of discretion” test, which
(as its name suggests) focuses on whether a function requires discretion in
applying government authority, and (2) the “nature of the function” test, which
focuses on whether a function involves the “exercise of sovereign powers.”16 If
a function is inherently governmental under either test, it should be designated
as an inherently governmental function that is ineligible for federal
contracting.17

public-function approach, which is “motivated by the idea that prison administration must be guided solely by
public values”); Paul Howard Morris, Note, The Impact of Constitutional Liability on the Privatization
Movement After Richardson v. McKnight, 52 VAND. L. REV. 489, 495 (1999); Stephanie Frazier Stacy,
Comment, Capitalist Punishment: The Wisdom and Propriety of Private Prisons, 70 NEB. L. REV. 900, 913
(1991).
12
See Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L.
Rev. 397, 460 (2006); Volokh, supra note 4, at 157; Lucas Anderson, Note, Kicking the National Habit: The
Legal and Policy Arguments for Abolishing Private Prison Contracts, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 113 (2009).
13
See infra Section I.B.1.
14
31 U.S.C. § 501 note (2012) (Federal Activities Inventory Reform).
15
JOHN R. LUCKEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40641, INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL
FUNCTIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OPERATIONS: BACKGROUND, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS
(2009); see also Lisa Vecoli, The Politics of Privatization, 15 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y, 243, 243–45
(1994).
16
Policy Letter 11-01, Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 76 Fed. Reg.
56,227, 56,237 (Sept. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Policy Letter 11-01].
17
Id.

CARROLL GALLEYPROOFS2

298

12/22/2017 9:51 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:293

The exercise of discretion test and the nature of the function test provide a
useful structure for analyzing the propriety of prison privatization because the
tests encapsulate two fundamentally different approaches to the issue. The
exercise of discretion test reflects an approach to the prison privatization
debate that focuses on the real-world effects of privatization. This test, which
prohibits private contractors from performing functions involving the exercise
of discretion in applying government authority, reflects the value of democratic
accountability and seeks to guard against potential abuses of discretion by the
private sector.18 Looking to the degree of discretion associated with a function
makes sense for critics of prison privatization who are concerned with
behavior, accountability mechanisms, and outcomes rather than with
philosophical ideas about the nature of imprisonment.19
In contrast, the nature of the function test reflects the view that it is wrong
to privatize certain functions because of inherent differences between the
public and private sectors.20 The inherent view underlies “the fundamental
moral criticism that imprisonment is an intrinsic or core state function that . . .
cannot legitimately be delegated” to a non-state actor.21 Contingent empirical
claims about privatization are irrelevant under this approach, which instead
draws “on high-level political or moral theory, the purposes of criminal
punishment, liberal legitimacy, liberty and dignity, symbolism and social
meaning.”22
This Comment proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides background to the
privatization of detention services in the United States and discusses the legal
and regulatory framework governing the designation of functions as inherently
governmental or “commercial.” Part II applies the exercise of discretion test to
the operation of prison and detention facilities. Part III analyzes whether the
operation of prison and detention facilities is an inherently governmental
function under the nature of the function test. Finally, Part IV discusses the
implications of designating the operation of these facilities an inherently
governmental function and why the inherently governmental function
provision of the FAIR Act is a desirable law. This Comment concludes that the
operation of prison and detention facilities is an inherently governmental

18

See Policy Letter 11-01, supra note 16, at 56,237–38.
See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 4.
20
See, e.g., JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 11
(1989) (“Are there not some values inherent in publicness or privateness per se, beyond the purely
instrumental?”).
21
See Richard Harding, Private Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST.: REV. RES. 265, 266 (2001).
22
Volokh, supra note 4, at 135.
19
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function under either of the two tests. Accordingly, the practice of contracting
with private companies to operate federal prison and detention facilities
violates the FAIR Act and should be discontinued.
I.

PRISON PRIVATIZATION AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL CONTRACTING

This Part introduces the issue of prison privatization by providing, in
section A, a brief history of its implementation in the United States and current
prison population statistics. Second, in section B, this Part explains the legal
and regulatory framework governing how federal agencies classify functions
for procurement purposes.
A. Overview of Prison Privatization in the United States
In the 1980s and 1990s, the American corrections system faced a crisis of
overcrowding.23 Increased public demand for imprisonment of criminals and
harsher sentencing policies produced dramatic growth in the prison
population.24 Rising prison violence, out-of-date government facilities, and the
unpopularity of early-release policies put pressure on governments to find a
solution.25
Struggling to provide adequate facilities for a growing population of
inmates, state and local governments turned to private corrections companies
in the 1980s.26 This response accorded with the political values that defined the
Reagan era, such as limited government and faith in the private sector.27 Free
market advocates promoted prison privatization as a means of achieving
greater efficiency and reducing government bureaucracy.28 But it was not until
1996—shortly after President Clinton declared, “The era of big Government is

23
Samuel Jan Brakel, Private Corrections, in PRIVATIZING THE UNITED STATES JUSTICE SYSTEM:
POLICE, ADJUDICATION, AND CORRECTIONS SERVICES FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR 254, 254 (Gary W. Bowman
et al. eds., 1992).
24
JUDY S. GRANT & DIANE CAROL BAST, CORRECTIONS AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR: A GUIDE FOR
PUBLIC OFFICIALS 2 (1987); DAVID F. LINOWES ET AL., PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON PRIVATIZATION,
PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 146 (1988) (“From 1979 to 1986, state and federal
prison populations increased by approximately 74 percent . . . .”); PHILIP MATTERA ET AL., GOOD JOBS FIRST,
JAIL BREAKS: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIES GIVEN TO PRIVATE PRISONS 2 (2001).
25
See Brakel, supra note 23; GRANT & BAST, supra note 24, at 2.
26
See Makarios & Maahs, supra note 4, at 338; MATTERA ET AL., supra note 24, at 1–2.
27
See Makarios & Maahs, supra note 4, at 338.
28
See Charles H. Logan & Sharla P. Rausch, Punish and Profit: The Emergence of Private Enterprise
Prisons, 2 JUST. Q. 303, 306–07 (1985).
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over”29—that Congress expressly authorized the BOP to contract with the
private sector for the operation of prisons.30
In 1997, the BOP began contracting with private correctional institutions to
respond to this mandate and alleviate overcrowding in its facilities.31 Since
then, the BOP has contracted with the Corrections Corporation of America,
GEO Group, Inc., and the Management and Training Corporation to confine a
portion of the federal inmate population, primarily low-security men.32 The
federal prison population reached its peak in 2013 and has since been
declining.33 Recent estimations of the proportion of BOP inmates housed in
contract prisons range from 12%–15% of the total of about 195,000.34
Privatization has also played an increasingly important role in immigration
detention as the population of detainees has swelled.35 As of 2016,
approximately 65% of ICE detainees are housed in facilities operated by
private, for-profit contractors.36 Roughly speaking, the numbers of inmates in
private facilities are comparable for the BOP and ICE, although ICE has a
much higher proportion in private facilities.37 ICE contracts for detention
services with the same private companies that operate prison facilities under
contracts with the BOP, such as CoreCivic (formerly the Corrections
Corporation of America).38
Existing procurement regulations and policies place prison and detention
facilities in a nebulous intermediate category lying between inherently
governmental function and commercial activity.39 The operation of prison and
29
William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan.
23, 1996), in 1996 PUB. PAPERS 79 (1996).
30
See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. A, tit. I, § 101(a),
110 Stat. 3009, 3009-11 (1996).
31
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS’ MONITORING OF CONTRACT PRISONS 1 (2016).
32
Id.; see also Brakel, supra note 23, at 269.
33
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 1.
34
Id.; HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZED
IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES 7 (2016).
35
See Mary Bosworth & Emma Kaufman, Foreigners in a Carceral Age: Immigration and
Imprisonment in the United States, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 429, 433–34 (2011) (discussing dramatic
growth in the detainee population since the 1990s).
36
HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 6 tbl.1.
37
See id. at 7.
38
See, e.g., Stewart Detention Center, CCA, http://www.cca.com/facilities/stewart-detention-center
(last visited Feb. 8, 2017); supra note 32 and accompanying text.
39
See Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 7.503(d) (2016) (listing prisoner detention as an
example of functions “generally not considered to be inherently governmental functions” but that “may
approach being in that category because of the nature of the function, the manner in which the contractor
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detention facilities is designated as a function “closely associated” with
inherently governmental functions.40 As the next section explains, this
designation allows private contractors to operate prisons subject to federal
government oversight.41 The federal government currently fails to recognize
prisoner detention as an inherently governmental function that is off-limits to
contracting.
B. The Legal and Regulatory Framework Governing Privatization
Under the FAIR Act, the designation of a function as either commercial or
inherently governmental determines whether that function is eligible for
federal contracting.42 This section explains the legal and regulatory framework
that governs an agency’s function designations by discussing three key
sources: (1) the FAIR Act, (2) the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and
(3) the OMB Circular A-76 (Circular). These sources—respectively, a statute,
a regulation, and a policy document—govern the classification of functions for
procurement purposes.43 This section discusses how the FAR and the Circular
both implement and diverge from the controlling statute, the FAIR Act.
1. The FAIR Act
Congress enacted the FAIR Act in 1998 to provide a competitive sourcing
process that would maximize government reliance on the private sector.44
Congress intended to reduce government costs, harness the benefits of
competition, and “do a favor for every U.S. taxpayer.”45 The FAIR Act tasked
agencies to identify their commercial activities capable of being performed by
the private sector and to submit annual inventories of these activities to the
OMB.46 The Act codified a distinction between commercial activities, which
performs the contract, or the manner in which the Government administers contractor performance”); 48
C.F.R. § 7.503(d)(19); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 4100.05, BUREAU OF PRISONS ACQUISITION POLICY 40 (2016)
(describing which contracts are reported as “Closely Associated Functions”).
40
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 40.
41
See Policy Letter 11-01, supra note 16, at 56, 241–42.
42
See 31 U.S.C. § 501 note (2012) (Federal Activities Inventory Reform).
43
For a discussion of whether the Circular, a self-described policy document, is legally binding, see
KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42325, DEFINITIONS OF “INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL
FUNCTION” IN FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW AND GUIDANCE 9–10 (2014).
44
Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 586, 597 (2000) (noting that the Act’s
principal sponsor stated that “Congress intended [the FAIR Act] to ‘codif[y] a process to assure government
reliance on the private sector to the maximum extent feasible’” (second alteration in original) (quoting 144
CONG. REC. S9105 (daily ed. July 28, 1998) (statement of Sen. Thomas))).
45
144 CONG. REC. 23,477 (1998) (statement of Rep. Sessions).
46
31 U.S.C. § 501 note (2012) (Federal Activities Inventory Reform).
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may be performed by private contractors, and inherently governmental
functions, which are off-limits to contracting.47 This section discusses the
FAIR Act’s definition of inherently governmental function and explains the
obstacles to challenging prison privatization under this statute.
The FAIR Act defines an inherently governmental function as a function
that must be performed by federal government employees because it is “so
intimately related to the public interest.”48 The Act characterizes inherently
governmental functions as “activities that require either the exercise of
discretion in applying Federal Government authority or the making of value
judgments in making decisions for the Federal Government.”49 The Act lists
several types of inherently governmental functions, including the “execution of
the laws of the United States so as . . . to significantly affect the life, liberty, or
property of private persons.”50 It also describes what is not an inherently
governmental function: providing information or advice to the federal
government, and “any function that is primarily ministerial and internal in
nature,” such as cafeteria food service, cleaning, and routine mechanical
tasks.51
The FAIR Act’s definition of inherently governmental function requires
some interpretation by the agencies that must implement it.52 How can an
agency determine when a function is so “intimately related to the public
interest” that it requires performance by government employees? What does it
mean to “significantly affect” the life, liberty, or property of private persons?
The statutory definition offers broad principles rather than concrete criteria.
Nevertheless, the potential implications of the FAIR Act’s definition of
inherently governmental function for prison privatization are apparent. What
more significantly and directly affects “the life, liberty, or property of private
persons” than carrying out the confinement of prisoners?53 Furthermore, the
FAIR Act’s “inherently governmental function” language aligns closely with a
common argument against prison privatization.54 As criminologist Dr. Charles
47

Id.
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
See Volokh, supra note 4, at 157 (observing that the FAIR Act’s definition of inherently
governmental function “obviously is not a model of clarity”).
53
See Dolovich, supra note 11, at 441 (“Incarceration is among the most severe and intrusive
manifestations of power the state exercises against its own citizens.”).
54
See, e.g., Charles H. Logan, The Propriety of Proprietary Prisons, 51 FED. PROB., Sept. 1987, at 35,
35.
48
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Logan argues, “The most principled objection to the propriety of commercial
prisons is the claim that imprisonment is an inherently and exclusively
governmental function and therefore should not be performed by the private
sector at all . . . .”55
Given the congruence between this line of anti-privatization argument and
the language of the FAIR Act, it may seem puzzling that there has been no
lawsuit challenging prison privatization under the FAIR Act. Although a few
scholars have argued that the prison system is or may be an inherently
governmental function within the meaning of the FAIR Act,56 the statute’s
practical usefulness for litigants is limited. As explained below, the FAIR
Act’s “interested party” standing requirements and courts’ restrictive notions
of the Act’s “zone of interests” effectively preclude prisoners from bringing
suit under the Act.57
The FAIR Act establishes an administrative appeals process under which
an interested party may challenge the designation of a particular activity on an
agency’s inventory.58 It provides: “An interested party may submit to an
executive agency a challenge of an omission of a particular activity from, or an
inclusion of a particular activity on, a list for which a notice of public
availability has been published . . . .”59 The Act defines interested party to
include the following individuals and entities:
(1) A private sector source that—
(A) is an actual or prospective offeror for any contract, or
other form of agreement, to perform the activity; and
(B) has a direct economic interest in performing the
activity that would be adversely affected by a
determination not to procure the performance of the
activity from a private sector source.
(2) A representative of any business or professional association that
includes within its membership private sector sources referred to in
paragraph (1).

55

Id.
See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 4, at 157; Anderson, supra note 12, at 123–24.
57
A statutory cause of action is presumed to extend only to plaintiffs whose interests “fall within the
zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 1377, 1388 (2014) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). See generally Lindsay Windsor,
Note, James Bond, Inc.: Private Contractors and Covert Action, 101 GEO. L. REV. 1427, 1437–40 (2013)
(discussing the standing issues that have resulted in a lack of case law clarifying the inherently governmental
function designation).
58
31 U.S.C. § 501 note (2012) (Federal Activities Inventory Reform).
59
Id.
56
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(3) An officer or employee of an organization within an executive
agency that is an actual or prospective offeror to perform the activity.
(4) The head of any labor organization . . . that includes within its
membership officers or employees of an organization referred to in
paragraph (3).60

The text of the statute does not contemplate challenges by private
parties who are not suffering a direct economic harm as a result of a
contracting decision. By the expressio unius maxim of statutory
construction, the statute’s explicit list implies that whoever is not listed
cannot challenge an agency designation.61 Thus, the FAIR Act appears to
preclude a challenge to an agency designation by a prisoner or detainee.
Furthermore, a prisoner or detainee would face a constitutional standing
hurdle as well; he or she would have to show an injury caused by the
privatization.62
The only type of interested party that could challenge the current
commercial designation of prison operation is a federal employee or union
whose employment is threatened by privatization.63 However, this is an
unlikely avenue for effecting a change in the designation of the function from
commercial to inherently governmental. Even if federal employees brought
this challenge, judicial review has not yet been granted under the FAIR Act to
these claims.64 Courts have narrowly circumscribed the standing of federal
employees to challenge agency decisions on the basis that federal employees
do not fall within the FAIR Act’s zone of interests, at least with respect to cost

60
Id. This provision of the FAIR Act was amended by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, div.
D § 739, Pub. L. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 2029–31 (2007), as amended by Omnibus Appropriations Act,
2009, div. D § 735, 736, Pub. L. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524, 689–91 (2009). However, the amended provision
effectively maintains the same parameters on eligibility to protest under the statute.
61
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of construction meaning that the inclusion of one
thing implies the exclusion of another. See generally Clifton Williams, Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius,
15 MARQUETTE L. REV. 191 (1931).
62
See Nat’l Air Traffic Controllers Ass’n v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Transp., 654 F.3d 654, 659 (6th Cir.
2011) (holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to show they were harmed by the
privatization of a federal facility).
63
For example, federal seafood inspectors successfully challenged the decision of the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration to reclassify the function of seafood inspector as a commercial function. See
James J. McCullough et al., Feature Comment: Year 2003 OMB Circular A-76 Decisions and Developments,
GOV’T CONTRACTOR, Jan. 21, 2004, ¶ 27, at 1, 2–3. In agreeing this function is inherently governmental, the
Department of Commerce found that contracting it out could decrease public trust in the safety of seafood
products. Id.
64
Verkuil, supra note 12, at 452–53; see Courtney v. Smith, 297 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2002); Am. Fed’n
of Gov’t Emps. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 586 (2000).
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comparison decisions.65 Courts have reasoned that the legislative history of the
FAIR Act indicates that it was enacted to protect the interests of taxpayers and
the private sector, not the jobs of federal employees.66
Thus, although the FAIR Act provides a potential basis for challenging the
privatization of prison and detention facilities, its limitations on who may bring
this challenge in court have effectively precluded judicial review of the
designation of this function.
2. The Federal Acquisition Regulation
The FAR is another source of federal law and policy on inherently
governmental functions.67 Issued to promote the development of a uniform
procurement system, this regulation implements the FAIR Act and other
procurement statutes.68 The FAR affirms that “[c]ontracts shall not be used for
the performance of inherently governmental functions.”69 In addition, however,
the FAR recognizes an intermediate category between inherently governmental
functions and commercial functions—functions closely associated with
inherently governmental functions70—and places “prisoner detention or
transport” in this category.71
Functions in the closely associated category are not considered inherently
governmental but “may approach being in that category because of the nature
of the function” or the way the contract is performed or administered.72 Closely
associated functions can be performed by a contractor, but agencies that
contract out this type of function must “limit or guide a contractor’s exercise of

65
See, e.g., Courtney, 297 F.3d at 465 (concluding that the federal employee plaintiffs lacked prudential
standing to bring a cost comparison challenge because they were not within the “zone of interests” of the FAIR
Act and other procurement statutes, but suggesting that federal employees contending their work was
inherently governmental would have standing); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., 46 Fed. Cl. at 600 (concluding that
“Congress did not intend to include federal employees and their unions within the zone of interests protected
by section 2(e) of FAIR”).
66
Courtney, 297 F.3d at 466 (“[T]he plaintiffs’ interest in maintaining their federal employment is at
best marginally related to, and more likely inconsistent with, the purpose of the [FAIR Act].”).
67
LUCKEY ET AL., supra note 15, at 16.
68
KATE M. MANUEL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42826, THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION
REGULATION (FAR): ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 16 (2015).
69
Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 7.503(a) (2016).
70
48 C.F.R. § 7.503(d).
71
48 C.F.R. § 7.503(d)(19). Accordingly, the BOP categorizes privatized corrections contracts as a
“Closely Associated Function” in its acquisition policy. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 40.
72
48 C.F.R. § 7.503(d).
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discretion” and provide “meaningful oversight.”73 Congress provided that
agencies must give “special consideration to . . . using Federal employees to
perform” a function that falls into the closely associated with inherently
governmental functions category of the FAR.74
In the context of military contracting, Congress explicitly provided that
“acquisition functions closely associated with inherently governmental
functions” may be performed by a private contractor “only if the contracting
officer” ensures that “appropriate military or civilian personnel of the
Department of Defense cannot reasonably be made available to perform the
functions.”75 There is no comparable statute establishing such a requirement
for the prison context. If such a standard were applied in the prison context, it
would be difficult to satisfy because the government would have to show that
appropriate government personnel “cannot reasonably be made available” to
operate a prison.76
Under the existing procurement designation, prisoner detention is a
function closely associated with inherently governmental functions77 and the
BOP is required by statute to give “special consideration . . . to using Federal
employees to perform” this function.78 It is unclear how the BOP could give
“special consideration . . . to using Federal employees to perform” the function
of prisoner detention without phasing out contract prisons.79 Thus, the FAR’s
designation of prisoner detention as a function closely associated with
inherently governmental functions is misguided not only because it fails to
recognize the function as inherently governmental, but also because it
introduces further ambiguity into the procurement decision making process.

73
Policy Letter 11-01, supra note 16, at 56,241–42. The BOP’s approach to contract prisons appears to
have been consistent with the oversight requirement for managing closely associated functions. See Contract
Prisons, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/facilities/contract_facilities.jsp (last visited
Oct. 29, 2017) (BOP onsite monitors oversee the contractor’s compliance with various functions).
74
31 U.S.C. § 501 note (2012) (Public-Private Competition).
75
10 U.S.C. § 2383(a)(1) (2012).
76
Id. This standard would be easier to satisfy in the military context than in the prison context because
of the special nature of military functions, which require more expertise and training. Additionally, the military
may have to mobilize high numbers of personnel quickly, while the staffing requirements of the prison system
are more predictable.
77
48 C.F.R. § 7.503(d)(19).
78
31 U.S.C. § 501 note (Public-Private Competition).
79
Id.
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3. OMB Circular A-76
OMB Circular A-76 and its attachments have long been key resources for
determining whether an activity is inherently governmental because they
provide guidelines for determining whether an activity should be contracted
out.80 In accordance with the FAIR Act,81 the current version of the Circular
requires the government to contract out commercial activities that can be
performed more cheaply by the private sector, but prohibits the government
from outsourcing inherently governmental functions.82
In 2003, the Bush administration revised the Circular to promote greater
reliance on competitive sourcing.83 In addition, the revision included two
important changes relevant to the designation of prison privatization. First, the
revision modified the level of discretion that makes a function inherently
governmental by requiring that there be an exercise of substantial discretion.84
Although the FAIR Act characterizes inherently governmental functions as
activities that require the exercise of discretion, the revised Circular states that
inherently governmental functions “require the exercise of substantial
discretion.”85 Because the Circular requires the exercise of discretion to be
substantial for a function to qualify as inherently governmental, OMB’s policy
on inherently governmental functions is effectively less strict than the statutory
prohibition on privatizing such functions. The policy choice to restrict the
definition of inherently governmental by requiring the exercise of substantial
discretion was controversial at the time of the revision.86

80
LUCKEY ET AL., supra note 15, at 5. OMB and its predecessor, the Bureau of the Budget, recognized
a distinction between governmental responsibilities and commercial activities in procurement policy decades
before passage of the FAIR Act. See BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BULL. NO.
55-4, COMMERCIAL-INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDING PRODUCTS OR SERVICES FOR
GOVERNMENTAL USE (1955).
81
The Circular was revised to implement the FAIR Act in 1999. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-76, PERFORMANCE OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES
(1999).
82
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 10.
83
See Performance of Commercial Activities: Proposed Revision to Office of Management and Budget
Circular No. A-76, 67 Fed. Reg. 69,769, 69,772 (Nov. 19, 2002).
84
See Performance of Commercial Activities: Revision to Office of Management and Budget Circular
No. A-76, 68 Fed. Reg. 32,134, 32,138 (May 29, 2003) (“This guidance expressly states that ‘inherently
governmental functions necessarily involve the exercise of substantial discretion.’”).
85
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 10, at Attachment A
(emphasis added).
86
In response to some commenters’ objections, OMB justified the change by stating that it was merely
providing additional guidance on the meaning of the phrase exercise of discretion. See Performance of
Commercial Activities: Revision to Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-76, 68 Fed. Reg. at
32,138.
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Second, the Circular was revised to include an express exemption of prison
and detention facilities from the inherently governmental function category.87
The Circular directs agencies to avoid transferring inherently governmental
authority to a contractor by considering factors such as “[t]he provider’s
authority to take action that will significantly and directly affect the life,
liberty, or property of individual members of the public, including the
likelihood of the provider’s need to resort to force,” but specifies that this
guidance should not be taken to prohibit contracting for “the operation of
prison or detention facilities.”88 Prior to the 2003 revision, the Circular did not
expressly indicate the designation of prison or detention facilities.89
It appears that OMB included the express exemption for prisons in the
revised Circular in response to concerns raised by corrections companies in the
notice-and-comment process. When the proposed revised Circular was
published for public comment in 2002, it did not include the express reference
to the operation of prison or detention facilities.90 Several companies expressed
concern that the revised Circular could be interpreted as prohibiting contracts
for privately run prisons.91 For instance, Wackenhut Corrections Corporation
was troubled by the proposed Circular’s reframing of the part of the definition
of inherently governmental function relating to the “life, liberty, or property of
private persons.”92 The corporation stated that the proposed Circular could
“cause confusion as to whether prison and detention services are now
inherently governmental activities” because prison and detention services
“arguably do ‘significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private
persons.’”93 OMB chose to retain its proposed definition of inherently
governmental function, but added the express affirmation that the Circular
permits contracting for the operation of prisons and detention facilities.
As the following two Parts will argue, the policy choice not to designate
the operation of prison and detention facilities as an inherently governmental

87

See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 10, at Attachment A.
Id.
89
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 81.
90
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-76 REVISED
DRAFT, PERFORMANCE OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES (2002).
91
See, e.g., Letter from G.A. Puryear, Gen. Counsel, Corr. Corp. of America, to David. C. Childs,
Office of Fed. Procurement Policy (Dec. 16, 2002), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/
circulars/a076/comments/a76-126.pdf.
92
Letter from Louis V. Carrillo, Vice President, Wackenhut Corr. Corp., to David. C. Childs, Office of
Fed. Procurement Policy (Dec. 18, 2002), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/circulars/a076/
comments/a76-126.pdf.
93
Id.
88
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function is an unreasonable interpretation of the FAIR Act under either test for
inherently governmental function.
II. THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION TEST
Part I demonstrated the complexity and ambiguity of the legal and
regulatory framework governing the designation of functions as inherently
governmental or commercial. This ambiguity led the Obama Administration to
conclude that “the line between inherently governmental activities that should
not be outsourced and commercial activities that may be subject to private
sector competition has been blurred and inadequately defined.”94 In 2009,
concerned that contractors might be performing inherently governmental
functions, President Obama tasked OMB to develop guidance clarifying when
governmental outsourcing of services is, and is not, appropriate.95
In response, OMB’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) issued
Policy Letter 11-01 to provide guidance for agencies on identifying and
managing inherently governmental functions.96 Policy Letter 11-01 established
two tests for identifying inherently governmental functions: (1) the exercise of
discretion test and (2) the nature of the function test.97
This Part applies the exercise of discretion test to the issue of private prison
and detention facilities. Under this test,
A function requiring the exercise of discretion shall be deemed
inherently governmental if the exercise of that discretion commits the
government to a course of action where two or more alternative
courses of action exist and decision making is not already limited or
guided by existing policies, procedures, directions, orders, and other
guidance that:
(I) identify specified ranges of acceptable decisions or conduct
concerning the overall policy or direction of the action; and
(II) subject the discretionary decisions or conduct to meaningful
oversight and, whenever necessary, final approval by agency
officials.98

94
Government Contracting: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74
Fed. Reg. 9,755, 9,755–56 (Mar. 6, 2009).
95
Id. at 9,756.
96
Policy Letter 11-01, supra note 16, at 56,236.
97
Id. at 56,237.
98
Id.
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The exercise of discretion test is consistent with the Circular, which focuses on
“the exercise of substantial discretion,”99 and with a key aspect of the FAIR
Act’s definition of inherently governmental function.100 The FAIR Act
provides that inherently governmental functions include activities that require
“the exercise of discretion in applying Federal Government authority.”101 The
statute states that such functions may involve, among other things, the power
to bind the United States, to advance the United States’ interests by diplomatic
actions or judicial proceedings, or “to significantly affect the life, liberty, or
property of private persons.”102 In addition, the statute’s specification of what
is not an inherently governmental function suggests that a degree of discretion
is an important aspect of the meaning of the term. Under the FAIR Act, “[t]he
term does not normally include . . . any function that is primarily ministerial
and internal in nature” such as “mail operations, operation of cafeterias,
housekeeping, . . . [and] other routine electrical or mechanical services.”103
In terms of the exercise of discretion, the operation of a prison evidently
falls somewhere between judicial or diplomatic decision making and purely
ministerial functions like housekeeping. Whether imprisonment is an
inherently governmental function can plausibly be argued both ways under the
exercise of discretion test as formulated in Policy Letter 11-01. In this respect,
the exercise of discretion test provides weaker support for the argument that
imprisonment is an inherently governmental function than the nature of the
function test.104
Nevertheless, the best conclusion is that imprisonment is an inherently
governmental function under the exercise of discretion test because this
outcome is most consistent with the controlling statute. The FAIR Act
emphasizes the potential effect of a discretionary function on the public
interest and the “life, liberty, or property of private persons.”105 As the
following section shows, the administration and guarding of prisons requires
the exercise of discretion. The gravity of decisions made in this context is such
that any exercise of discretion is “intimately related to the public interest.”106
The imprisonment of citizens epitomizes the government’s power to affect the

99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 10, at Attachment A.
See 31 U.S.C. § 501 note (2012) (Federal Activities Inventory Reform).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra Part III.
31 U.S.C. § 501 note (Federal Activities Inventory Reform).
Id.
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life, liberty, and property of private persons in the name of the public
interest.107
This Part proceeds in three sections. Section A discusses how the
government limits the discretion of private prison corporations and argues that
private prison employees nevertheless exercise some discretion within a highly
regulated environment. Section B explains why the exercise of discretion is
problematic in the private-prison context. Section C analyzes whether prison
operation is an inherently governmental function under the exercise of
discretion test and the language of the FAIR Act.
A. The Role of Discretion in Prison Administration and Guarding
On one hand, government regulations and contracts with private prison
corporations do much to minimize the level of discretion exercised by the
corporations and their employees. Private-prison rules tend to replicate the
rules that apply in public-sector prisons; where private facilities develop
different rules, the rules must be approved by state authorities or conform with
state standards.108 Professor Alexander Volokh observes that private prison
“contracts have often reproduced the entire public-sector rulebook in
excruciating detail,” which leaves private prisons “limited scope for
experimentation.”109 For example, Arizona goes so far as to require that private
prisons follow the same daily menus as state facilities.110 Federal private
prisons operate according to a Statement of Work or Performance Work
Statement, which specifies the requirements for contractors.111 Contractors are
required to adhere to some BOP policies such as inmate discipline, use of
force, sentence computation, and inmate classification.112 At each contract

107

See Dolovich, supra note 11, at 441.
Harding, supra note 21, at 276; see, e.g., Operations and Management Service Contract, LAKE CITY
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY 16 (2009), http://www.dms.myflorida.com/content/download/83173/475828/
REDACTED_-_Lake_City_2009_O&M_Contract.pdf (“CCA will develop a policy implementing a system of
inmate rules and disciplinary procedures in compliance with the ACA Standards and penalties consistent with
those imposed by the [Florida Department of Corrections].”).
109
Sasha Volokh, Don’t End Federal Private Prisons, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 19,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/08/19/dont-end-federal-privateprisons/?utm_term=.8a3ddc6c5c4b.
110
DEBRA K. DAVENPORT, OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN., NO. 01-13, PERFORMANCE AUDIT: ARIZONA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS PRIVATE PRISONS 9 (2001) (“In order to maintain uniform standards for state
and private prisons, the Department requires contractors to follow Department Orders, Director’s Instructions,
Technical Manuals, Institution Orders, and Post Orders. These requirements extend to specific details, such as
following the same daily menus as state-operated facilities.”).
111
Contract Prisons, supra note 73.
112
Id.
108

CARROLL GALLEYPROOFS2

312

12/22/2017 9:51 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:293

prison, two BOP onsite monitors and a BOP Contracting Officer oversee the
contractor’s compliance with functions ranging from correctional programs to
health services.113
Contractual requirements may be created in response to specific problems.
For example, at Reeves County Detention Center, an immigration detention
facility operated by the GEO Group, there were no minimum staffing
requirements for several years in an effort to reduce costs.114 Following inmate
riots in 2008 and 2009—where over 2,000 inmates engaged in the fighting,
three inmates were hospitalized, two workers were taken hostage, and the
recreation area was set on fire115—the BOP decided to establish a minimum
staffing requirement in the contract.116 This example illustrates the risk posed
by excessive discretion in the hands of private actors and suggests the reason
why private prisons are regulated so extensively.117 It also suggests that
reactive regulation is insufficient to prevent adverse effects that may flow from
the exercise of discretion by private prison companies.
Despite the highly regulated nature of private prisons, the duties of private
prison employees necessarily involve the exercise of discretion. To maintain
order and safety, those operating a prison must be able to discipline and
impose sanctions on prisoners such as segregation, limitations on visiting
rights, and suspension of privileges.118 In most states, wardens are authorized
to draft institutional rules relating to discipline.119 The enforcement of these
rules is left to the discretion of prison staff.120 Prison employees must decide
whether to administer punishment in response to inmate misconduct, and
guards are often called upon to decide appropriate punishments.121 If a prison
guard decides to write up an inmate for violating regulations, the inmate will
be called to a hearing where it will often come down to the inmate’s word

113

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 31, at i.
Id. at 2–3, 5.
115
Inmates Riot for a Second Time at Texas Prison, CNN (Feb. 1, 2009, 5:10 AM), http://www.
cnn.com/2009/CRIME/02/01/texas.prison.riot/index.html?eref=ib_us.
116
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 2–3.
117
See David E. Pozen, Managing a Correctional Marketplace: Prison Privatization in the United States
and the United Kingdom, 19 J.L. & POL. 253, 282 (2003) (identifying riots and abuse of inmates “as indicative
of the risks of contracting” because “with for-profit operators, a prison can quickly degenerate when its
management is determined to save money by cutting corners and the government does not intervene”).
118
Harding, supra note 21, at 276.
119
David N. Wecht, Note, Breaking the Code of Deference: Judicial Review of Private Prisons, 96 YALE
L.J. 815, 821 (1987).
120
Id.
121
Anderson, supra note 12, at 122.
114
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against that of the guard who noted the infraction, since inmates do not have a
right to counsel at this proceeding.122
Penalties may include revocation of “good time” credits.123 Good time is
credited against an inmate’s total sentence (up to a limited number of days) for
the purpose of incentivizing good behavior and promoting rehabilitation.124
Prison wardens may exercise discretion in influencing the award of good time
credits and imposing good time sanctions that affect the date of release.125
Another form of discretion in the prison context is that which prison guards
exercise in their daily encounters with inmates.126 Guards operate in an
unpredictable, coercive environment where they must routinely make decisions
about how to respond to inmates and whether to use force.127 Guards and other
prison personnel exercise wide discretion affecting inmates’ liberty interests
with respect to intrusions on inmates’ privacy.128
A certain amount of discretion in the operation of a prison is desirable as
well as necessary, notably in the area of internal prison disciplinary processes.
For example, the 2016 report by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
criticizes private prisons on the basis of their “failure to initiate discipline in
over 50 percent of incidents reviewed by the onsite monitors during a 6-month
period.”129 As Professor Volokh points out, “whether you should initiate
discipline in any given case is a matter of judgment” and it would obviously
not be desirable to have “a bright-line insistence on initiating discipline 100%
of the time.”130 Whether or not it is true that the private prisons studied by the
OIG should have initiated discipline more often, their authority to make this
decision is a clear example of the role of discretion in prisons. The role of
discretion in prison administration and guarding is a double-edged sword. On
one hand, prison administrators and guards need some discretion to be able to

122

Dolovich, supra note 11, at 519–20.
Bruce R. Jacob, Prison Discipline and Inmate Rights, 5 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 227,
231 (1970).
124
Id.
125
LINOWES ET AL., supra note 24, at 148–49; Logan, supra note 54, at 37.
126
See Wecht, supra note 119, at 819 (explaining that “in areas profoundly affecting the Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interests and process rights of prison inmates, the courts have continued to accord broad
deference to the judgment of prison personnel”).
127
See generally Mother Jones, My Four Months as a Private Prison Guard: Part One, YOUTUBE (June
23, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cBiqRGXog4w (providing a firsthand account of a journalist’s
experience working as a private prison guard in a chaotic, violent environment).
128
Wecht, supra note 119, at 822.
129
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 28.
130
Volokh, supra note 109.
123
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do their jobs effectively and impose discipline. However, this level of
discretion also gives administrators and guards the opportunity to abuse it.
B. Why the Exercise of Discretion Is Problematic in the Private Prison
Context
Based on the forms of discretion described above, critics of prison
privatization argue that private prison corporations and their employees may
use their discretion in ways that harm the public interest. Critics argue that the
profit motive leads private prison corporations to cut corners in areas such as
staffing and health care.131 The riots that occurred at Reeves County Detention
Center vividly illustrate how efforts to cut costs may impact security and
prisoners’ welfare.132
Another reason why the exercise of discretion is problematic in the private
prison context is that it undermines the notion that prison merely represents the
administration of punishment. Some supporters of prison privatization draw a
distinction between the allocation and the administration of punishment.133
They acknowledge that the allocation of punishment—the function of the
criminal justice system—is nondelegable, but argue that the administration of
punishment may be delegated to private entities because it is “a technical and
morally neutral process to ensure that the allocated punishment is carried out
according to law and due process.”134
Some of the discretionary aspects of prison administration described in the
above section have a quasi-judicial character that blurs the line between the
allocation and the administration of punishment.135 Contrary to the binary
allocation-administration theory, the administration of punishment is not a
purely technical, neutral process in practice.136 Australian law professor and
prison consultant Richard Harding argues that some tasks delegated to private
prison operators involve the allocation of punishment, notably disciplinary
matters and prisoner classification.137 Harding writes: “New deprivations of
liberty such as . . . restrictions upon privileges or stricter levels of
131
See, e.g., Investigation into Private Prisons Reveals Crowding, Under-Staffing and Inmate Deaths,
supra note 8.
132
See supra notes 115–17.
133
Elaine Genders, Accountability, in DICTIONARY OF PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT 2, 2–3 (Yvonne
Jewkes & Jamie Bennett eds., 2007); Harding, supra note 21, at 275.
134
Harding, supra note 21, at 275 (summarizing the allocation-administration argument).
135
See Logan, supra note 54, at 37.
136
See Harding, supra note 21.
137
Id. at 275–78.
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incarceration, are tantamount to the allocation of punishment . . . .”138 Because
prison operators must maintain order through imposing disciplinary actions
and sanctions on prisoners, the administration of punishment in the form of
imprisonment necessarily involves decisions about allocating punishment to
some degree.139 As a general matter, judges are selected for their ability to be
impartial in allocating punishment. The same cannot be said for private prison
employees.
Professor Sharon Dolovich contends that decisions of disciplinary hearings
and parole boards may be skewed against inmates because prison guards are
employed by companies “with a direct financial stake . . . in maintaining a high
occupancy rate.”140 Some privatization critics have even argued that private
prisons have “perverse incentive[s] . . . to create demand for [their] own
product[s], . . . by fomenting violence among current inmates in order to scuttle
parole chances, [or] arbitrarily reducing good time.”141 This argument may
seem implausible. However, even the perception of this conflict of interests is
a problem because the perceived possibility of unjust treatment by selfinterested private prisons undermines public trust.
The danger of abuse of discretion is compounded by the fact that private
prison corporations and their employees are less transparent and less
accountable to the public than federal agencies are.142 Notably, the records of
private prisons are not subject to the Freedom of Information Act to the same
extent as the records maintained by a federal agency operating a prison or
detention facility.143 The possibility of abuse of discretion is one of the chief
objections to prison privatization.

138

Id. at 275.
In response to the problematic power of private prison employees over decisions affecting duration of
confinement, legislators in some states have reserved to government officials final authority over
determinations bearing on length of sentence, such as parole decisions and reduction of good-time credit.
Dolovich, supra note 11, at 518–19.
140
Dolovich, supra note 11, at 520.
141
James Theodore Gentry, Note, The Panopticon Revisited: The Problem of Monitoring Private
Prisons, 96 YALE L.J. 353, 363 (1986).
142
See Joseph E. Field, Note, Making Prisons Private: An Improper Delegation of a Governmental
Power, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 649, 670 (1987). But cf. Brian Gran & William Henry, Holding Private Prisons
Accountable: A Socio-Legal Analysis of “Contracting Out” Prisons, 34 SOC. JUST., nos. 3–4, 2007–2008, at
173, 173–74 (arguing that private prisons can be held accountable through proper contract formation,
maintenance, and liability).
143
See Private Prison Information Act of 2015, H.R. 2470, 114th Cong. (2015) (a bill not ultimately
enacted that proposed to subject federal private prison records to the Freedom of Information Act in the same
way as records maintained by a government operator of a federal prison or detention facility).
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C. Application of the FAIR Act’s Discretion-Based Definition of Inherently
Governmental Function
The exercise of discretion test is designed to prevent discretionary
functions from falling into the hands of private contractors applying
government authority.144 The type of discretionary functions inherent in prison
operation fall squarely within that category of function the FAIR Act seeks to
make off-limits to contracting. Prison operation requires the exercise of
discretion in ways that are “intimately related to the public interest.”145
Decisions like which type of disciplinary action to take and whether to cite an
inmate for misbehavior are quasi-judicial decisions that “significantly affect
the life, liberty, or property of private persons.”146 Judgments about good time
credits and disciplinary action affect the duration and the conditions of
confinement.147 An inmate’s disciplinary record while in prison carries great
weight in a parole board’s decision making.148 Clearly, private prison
contractors exercise discretion with significant consequences for inmates’
liberties and the public interest.149
This reality is the basis for constitutional concerns about private prisons.150
A common constitutional objection is that the inherently discretionary controls
exercised by prison employees “cannot be influenced by the pecuniary aims of
the operator without offending prisoner due process rights.”151 Although
constitutional arguments are not the subject of this Comment, it is worth noting
that the FAIR Act incorporates constitutional considerations in its definition of
inherently governmental function, notably in its “life, liberty, or property”
provision.152
The FAIR Act and procurement policies seek to avoid the potential for
private abuses of discretion that could adversely affect the public interest in
several ways. The FAIR Act places the public interest and the exercise of

144

See Policy Letter 11-01 supra note 16, at 56,237.
31 U.S.C. § 501 note (2012) (Federal Activities Inventory Reform).
146
Id.; Anderson, supra note 12, at 124.
147
See supra Section II.A.
148
Dolovich, supra note 11, at 520.
149
See Warren L. Ratliff, The Due Process Failure of America’s Prison Privatization Statutes, 21
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 371 (1997).
150
See id. at 373 (“[M]ost of the statutes that now authorize private prisons are constitutionally
inadequate, because they allow private contractors to exercise inappropriate discretion concerning inmates’
liberties.”).
151
Anderson, supra note 12, at 122.
152
31 U.S.C. § 501 note (2012) (Federal Activities Inventory Reform).
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discretion at the center of the definition of inherently governmental function.153
It seeks to prevent the privatization of discretionary functions that
“significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private persons.”154
Additionally, policy documents such as the Circular recognize that the
potential for use of force is a factor that weighs on the side of finding a
function inherently governmental.155 The Circular directs agencies to consider
the likelihood of the provider’s need to resort to force in performing the
contract to avoid transferring inherently governmental authority to a
contractor.156 The level of discretion associated with a function determines the
possible consequences of private sector performance and the extent to which it
may affect the public interest. Thus, it is consistent with the purposes of the
FAIR Act and procurement policies to conclude that the detention of prisoners
is an inherently governmental function under the exercise of discretion test.
On the other hand, one could argue that the level of discretion involved in
operating a prison is not substantial enough to warrant the inherently
governmental function designation under the exercise of discretion test. The
Circular characterizes inherently governmental functions as activities that
require the exercise of “substantial discretion.”157 Similarly, Policy Letter 1101 interprets the exercise of discretion provision narrowly. To qualify as
inherently governmental under the test in the Policy Letter, a function must
involve decision making that “is not already limited or guided by existing
policies, procedures, directions, orders, and other guidance that: (I) identify
specified ranges of acceptable decisions or conduct . . . and (II) subject the
discretionary decisions or conduct to meaningful oversight.”158 As discussed
above, the decision making of private prison corporations and employees are
“limited or guided by” regulations and contractual requirements.159
Furthermore, the discretionary decisions of federal prison contractors are
arguably subject to meaningful oversight by agency officials.160 Policy Letter
11-01 states that “contractors routinely, and properly, exercise discretion in
performing functions for the Federal Government when[] providing advice,
opinions, or recommended actions.”161 Accordingly, it is plausible to argue that

153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161

Id.
Id.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 10, at Attachment A.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Policy Letter 11-01, supra note 16, at 56,237.
Id.; see supra Section II.A.
See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 31, at i.
Policy Letter 11-01, supra note 16, at 56,237.
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prison operation is not an inherently governmental function under the exercise
of discretion test as federal policy has developed the test.
However, this argument is flawed for three reasons. First, the operation of
a prison does involve substantial discretion, in that it requires prison operators
to exercise discretion regularly and with respect to matters that have grave
consequences for the life and liberty of prisoners. Some decisions, such as
whether to write up an inmate for an infraction, simply cannot be subjected to
meaningful oversight by agency officials. Second, although oversight of
contract prisons is thorough in principle, it has been found lacking in
practice.162 Third, prison operation can be distinguished from the stated
examples of discretionary functions appropriately performed by contractors
because the examples involve contractors providing information or advice to
the government, not applying government authority to private individuals in a
coercive context.163 As the Circular indicates, the potential for use of force is a
special factor that weighs against contracting out.164
Even if the discretion exercised in operating a prison is not sufficiently
substantial to require classification as an inherently governmental function
under existing policies, the discretion is sufficient to satisfy the statutory
definition of inherently governmental function. The Circular states that
inherently governmental functions “require the exercise of substantial
discretion,”165 but the FAIR Act characterizes inherently governmental
functions merely as “activities that require . . . the exercise of discretion.”166
The FAIR Act does not require that the discretion be substantial, unlimited, or
free from oversight.167 Because the Circular requires the exercise of discretion
to be substantial for a function to qualify as inherently governmental, OMB’s
policy on inherently governmental functions is less strict than the statutory
prohibition on privatizing such functions. This is not a valid interpretation of
the statute.168 The revised Circular illegitimately diverges from the FAIR Act’s

162
See, e.g., Investigation into Private Prisons Reveals Crowding, Under-Staffing and Inmate Deaths,
supra note 8.
163
See Policy Letter 11-01, supra note 16, at 56,237–38.
164
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 10, at Attachment A.
165
Id. (emphasis added); see supra notes 84–86.
166
31 U.S.C. § 501 note (2012) (Federal Activities Inventory Reform).
167
See id.
168
Even if the Circular is entitled to Chevron deference, the Circular’s heightened discretion
requirement could be invalidated either on the ground that the FAIR Act unambiguously defines the requisite
level of deference, or on the ground that OMB failed to provide reasons for its policy choice to heighten the
deference requirement. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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definition of inherently governmental function to the extent that it heightens
the discretion requirement for inherently governmental functions.169
Ultimately, the statute controls. The FAIR Act situates the exercise of
discretion test in relation to the centrality of a function to the public interest
and to the potential effect of discretion on the “life, liberty, or property of
private persons.”170 Failing to designate the operation of prisons as an
inherently governmental function is inconsistent with the FAIR Act.
III. THE NATURE OF THE FUNCTION TEST
The second test for determining whether a function is inherently
governmental is the nature of the function test.171 It provides as follows:
Functions which involve the exercise of sovereign powers of the
United States are governmental by their very nature. Examples of
functions that, by their nature, are inherently governmental are
officially representing the United States in an inter-governmental
forum or body, arresting a person, and sentencing a person convicted
of a crime to prison. A function may be classified as inherently
governmental based strictly on its uniquely governmental nature and
without regard to the type or level of discretion associated with the
function.172

This Part analyzes whether operating prison and detention facilities constitutes
an inherently governmental function under the nature of the function test.
Section A addresses the language of the test itself, focusing on the arrest and
sentencing examples. Section B explains how liberal ideas about state power,
individual liberty, and symbolic meaning support the conclusion that
imprisonment is an inherently governmental function. It specifically addresses
immigration detention facilities to the extent that they require a different
analysis. Section C discusses how courts have applied similar tests to various
functions, including prison-related functions.
A. Arrest, Sentencing, and Incarceration
The nature of the function test elaborates on the inherently governmental
concept and concretizes the “life, liberty, or property” provision of the FAIR
Act. Two of the three given examples of functions that are “by their nature”
169
170
171
172

See id.
31 U.S.C. § 501 note (Federal Activities Inventory Reform).
Policy Letter 11-01, supra note 16, at 56,237.
Id.
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inherently governmental are arrest and sentencing.173 Arrest and sentencing are
clear examples of the third form of inherently governmental function listed in
the FAIR Act: the “execution of the laws of the United States so as . . . to
significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private persons.”174
Both arrest and sentencing involve the legitimate use of government power
to restrict a person’s liberty. Both are carried out by actors who wear the badge
of state authority: police officers and judges.175 The moral legitimacy of
arresting and sentencing people rests on the traditional justifications of
criminal punishment including public safety, deterrence, retribution, and
incapacitation.176
The arrest and sentencing examples lend themselves to analogy with
imprisonment. Imprisonment is the logical continuation of the list of examples
after arrest and sentencing because it is the ultimate deprivation of a private
person’s liberty.177 It carries out the prison sentence and completes the law
enforcement process that began with arrest. Scholars have grouped arrest,
judgment, and incarceration together to illustrate the inherently governmental
nature of criminal justice. For example, criminologist John DiIulio writes:
“The badge of the arresting policeman, the robes of the judge, and the state
patch on the uniform of the corrections officer are symbols of the inherently
public nature of crime and punishment.”178 Imprisonment executes the laws
and serves the public interest in the same way that arrest and sentencing do.
All three examples given in the nature of the function test are activities that
would be illegitimate or impossible but for the badge of state authority. The
“uniquely governmental” language suggests that this test is concerned with
those activities that are not done except with government involvement or
authorization. Federal, state, and local governments are involved in myriad
aspects of American life and society: law enforcement, health care, education,
protection of natural resources, and so on. But not all of these activities are
inherently governmental such that they cannot legitimately be engaged in
without state authority. A private person without government authority may
tutor another or organize a river clean-up, but may not make arrests, sentence

173

Id.
31 U.S.C. § 501 note (Federal Activities Inventory Reform).
175
See John J. DiIulio, Jr., What’s Wrong with Private Prisons, PUB. INT., Summer 1988, at 66, 79.
176
See generally Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 69–74 (providing an
overview of utilitarian and nonutilitarian sentencing purposes).
177
See Dolovich, supra note 11, at 441.
178
DiIulio, supra note 175, at 79.
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others to prison, or imprison others.179 The uniquely governmental aspect of
the nature of the function test corresponds to the basic logic of the
“traditionally exclusive governmental function” test that courts have applied in
the context of constitutional rights, which is discussed below.180
B. Liberal Legitimacy: The Philosophical Case Against Prison Privatization
The moral argument that imprisonment is too inherently governmental to
be performed by private contractors animated the privatization debate long
before Policy Letter 11-01 and the FAIR Act.181 The starting point for this line
of argument is the fundamental liberal principle that the state may limit liberty
to the extent that it is justified by the public interest.182
1. State Power and Individual Liberty
Rooted in liberal principles as well as the statutory definition of inherently
governmental function, the nature of the function test explicitly incorporates
the concept of sovereign power. This concept is central for critics of
privatization who build upon the social contract theory of Thomas Hobbes and
John Locke—the theory that individuals in a state of nature gave up rights to a
sovereign government, which in turn provided security and protected every
citizen.183 The state’s authority to punish is granted to it by the public.184 By
incorporating the sovereign powers language into the nature of the function
test, Policy Letter 11-01 invokes this fundamental principle of political
philosophy and affirms its relevance for governmental outsourcing policy.
The principle that the state has the exclusive authority to punish or
otherwise use force against a private individual flows from the Hobbesian

179
See generally MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77,
78 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1946) (arguing that the modern state has a monopoly on the legitimate
use of force).
180
See infra Section III.C.
181
See, e.g., Privatization of Corrections: Hearings on Privatization of Prisons Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 16 (1985)
(statement of Clifford Steenhoff, Legislative Chair, American Federation of Government Employees’ National
Council of Bureau of Prison Locals).
182
See DAVID SHICHOR, PUNISHMENT FOR PROFIT: PRIVATE PRISONS/PUBLIC CONCERNS 48 (1995).
183
See id. at 46–47.
184
Interestingly, Dr. Charles Logan applies the social contract theory to come to the opposite conclusion
regarding prison privatization: “Since all legitimate powers of government are originally, and continuously,
delegated to it by citizens, those same citizens if they wish can specify that certain powers be further delegated
by the state, in turn, to private agencies. Because the authority does not originate with the state, it does not
attach inherently or uniquely to it, and can be passed along.” Logan, supra note 54, at 36.
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social contract theory.185 German sociologist Max Weber asserted that “the
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” is the
defining characteristic of the state in modern times.186 This conception of
legitimate government force justifies the government’s power to arrest private
citizens, sentence them to prison, and keep them in prison. As British
criminologist Phil Scraton and others have argued, “All forms of incarceration
imply the use of force. . . . [F]ew people taken into custody would accept their
loss of liberty so willingly if the full potential of state coercion was not
handcuffed to their wrists.”187 Based on this interpretation of the social
contract theory, only the state has the authority to incarcerate an individual.188
According to liberal critics of prison privatization, imprisonment cannot
ethically be delegated to the private sector because of the inherently public
nature of criminal punishment.189 As DiIulio writes: “[T]o remain legitimate
and morally significant, the authority to govern behind bars, to deprive citizens
of their liberty, to coerce (and even kill) them, must remain in the hands of
government authorities.”190 Convicted individuals are punished in the name of
the public good, and their imprisonment expresses the will of the public.191
Recently, this liberal line of argument found expression in an opinion by
the Supreme Court of Israel striking down as unconstitutional a law
establishing Israel’s first privately operated prison.192 The court reasoned that
the denial of personal liberty is justified only if it is done to further an essential
public interest and, therefore, the party denying the personal liberty must be
acting in the public interest rather than in the interest of a private, profitmaking enterprise.193 Additionally, the Israeli Supreme Court concluded that
the transfer of power to operate a prison from the state to a private

185

See SHICHOR, supra note 182, at 46–47.
WEBER, supra note 179, at 78 (emphasis omitted).
187
PHIL SCRATON ET AL., PRISONS UNDER PROTEST 61 (1991).
188
See Yijia Jing, The U.S. Experience in Prison Privatization, in 1 PRISON PRIVATIZATION: THE MANY
FACETS OF A CONTROVERSIAL INDUSTRY 55, 73 (Byron Eugene Price & John Charles Morris eds., 2012).
189
See, e.g., Morris, supra note 11, at 495; Stacy, supra note 11, at 908–13.
190
DiIulio, supra note 175, at 79.
191
For a discussion on the communal character of punishments, compare NILS CHRISTIE, CRIME
CONTROL AS INDUSTRY: TOWARDS GULAGS, WESTERN STYLE 145–46 (3d ed. 2000) (“[W]here the state exists,
the prison officer is my man. I would hold a hand on his key, or on the switch for the electric chair.”).
192
HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. of Law & Bus., Human Rights Div. v. Minister of Fin. [2009] (Isr.),
English translation, http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/05/050/026/n39/05026050.n39.pdf. The Israeli Supreme
Court, in this case, was sitting as the High Court of Justice. See The Judiciary: The Court System, ISR.
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF., http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/state/democracy/pages/the%20judiciary%20the%20court%20system.aspx.
193
Academic Ctr. of Law & Bus., Human Rights Div., at ¶ 22.
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concessionaire “violates the human dignity of the inmates” of the privately
managed prison because “the public purposes that underlie their imprisonment
and give it legitimacy are undermined” when “their imprisonment becomes a
means for a private corporation to make a profit.”194 Unconcerned with
empirical arguments—indeed, assuming that real-world conditions of
imprisonment were identical as between public and private prisons195—the
Israeli Supreme Court insisted that a dignitary harm would result from
privatization as a result of the private interests involved.196 In the court’s view,
those who carry out imprisonment must be acting in the public interest.
2. State Agents and Symbolic Meaning
To be legitimate, must a prison be exclusively operated by government
employees? The inherent critics of privatization answer, like the Israeli
Supreme Court, with an emphatic yes. As Norwegian scholar Nils Christie has
argued, the badge of government authority on a prison guard’s uniform
symbolizes the idea that the official stands in for the public and performs a
communal responsibility.197 Thus, the identity of the agent carrying out the
function of incarceration—and the perception of her identity—matters.
According to DiIulio, the key message that an abuse of liberty results in
deprivation of liberty “ought to be conveyed by the offended community of
law-abiding citizens, through its public agents, to the incarcerated
individual.”198 Professors Alon Harel and Ariel Porat write that the importance
of this social meaning “is grounded in foundational intuitions concerning
political legitimacy.”199 The need for public officials to carry out punishment is
a matter of intuition for some critics of privatization due to deeply rooted
values and ideas about liberal legitimacy and criminal punishment.
Scholars such as Professor Alexander Volokh critique the view that prisons
must be run by public employees to be legitimate. Professor Volokh challenges
the assumption that private and public employees are inherently different when
it comes to performing tasks for the government.200 He highlights a
194

Id. at ¶ 39.
Id. at ¶ 33.
196
Id. at ¶ 39.
197
CHRISTIE, supra note 191, at 145 (“The guard was [the public’s] guard, their responsibility, not an
employee of a branch of General Motors, or Volvo for that matter. The communal character of punishments
evaporates in the proposals for private prisons.”).
198
DiIulio, supra note 175, at 79.
199
Alon Harel & Ariel Porat, Commensurability and Agency: Two Yet-to-Be-Met Challenges for Law
and Economics, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 749, 769 (2011).
200
Volokh, supra note 4, at 139–40.
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fundamental similarity between employees and contractors: “[B]oth are people
who do the state’s bidding for money.”201 Volokh’s insight is—given that the
government can only act by entering contracts with private citizens to be its
agents—the agents have a market relationship with the state and work for the
private purpose of a salary, regardless of whether the government’s agents are
government employees or contractors.202 Ultimately, Volokh’s argument is a
rejection of the inherent approach to the issue of prison privatization—
effectively a rejection of the nature of the function test—not an argument about
how the test should come out with respect to prisons.203
Volokh’s argument underestimates the power a private contractor has over
its internal policies and culture and the importance of symbolic meaning.
Employees of private contractors do the bidding of the state, but indirectly;
first and foremost, they do the bidding of the private company that pays them.
Their identity, and the perception of their identity, is different from that of
public officials even if their motivation is the same.204 The state is “a network
of relationships among people,” as Volokh observes,205 but it is also an idea, a
symbol of the collective will. The nature of the function test is appropriate
where symbolism matters. Incarceration is the exclusive prerogative of the
state and represents the ultimate deprivation of fundamental rights.206 Given
the gravity of imprisoning an individual in the name of the public interest, the
identity of the agent who carries it out is of profound symbolic importance.207
It is significant that OFPP chose to preserve a role for abstract
considerations of the nature of a function, including aspects such as sovereign
powers, rather than confining the inherently governmental function standard to
a discretion-based inquiry. This choice was consistent with the FAIR Act. The
inherent view of privatization issues is, after all, written into the statute in the
concept of an “inherently governmental function.”208 The liberal critique of

201

Id. at 147.
See id. at 139–40.
203
See id.
204
See Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 40 VAND. L. REV. 813, 826
(1987) (suggesting that it weakens the authority of the sentencing court and the integrity of the justice system
“when an inmate looks at his keeper’s uniform and, instead of encountering an emblem that reads ‘Federal
Bureau of Prisons’ or ‘State Department of Corrections,’ he faces one that says ‘Acme Corrections
Company’”).
205
Volokh, supra note 4, at 138.
206
See Dolovich, supra note 11, at 441.
207
See Harel & Porat, supra note 199, at 769.
208
31 U.S.C. § 501 note (2012) (Federal Activities Inventory Reform) (emphasis added).
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privatization further manifests itself in the “life, liberty, or property” aspect of
the statutory definition of inherently governmental function.209
Under the nature of the function test, it is reasonable to conclude that most
but not all jobs required for running a prison are inherently governmental
functions.210 The test is concerned with sovereign power, a fundamental
characteristic of which is the use of legitimate force to deprive individuals of
their right to liberty. Under this view, any position that involves decisions that
implicate prisoners’ liberty or may require the use of force or threat of force
against a prisoner must be performed by a public official to be legitimate.
Making parole recommendations, working as a prison guard, and flipping the
electric switch in an execution are meaningful exercises of sovereign power;
preparing lunch for prisoners is not.211 Thus, it would be consistent with the
nature of the function test for the government to contract with a private food
service company to provide meals for its prisons, but not to contract out the
operation of a prison facility in its entirety. Each act that manifests the coercive
power of the state over a prisoner is a quintessential expression of sovereign
power, as that power has traditionally been understood in the liberal tradition.
3. Detention by Immigration Authorities
Immigration detention requires a slightly different analysis under the
nature of the function test. Although unauthorized immigration is increasingly
prosecuted as a criminal act,212 the detention of immigrants based on their
citizenship status is a civil or administrative detention and can be distinguished
conceptually from corrections.213 Incarceration is an expression of the state’s
power to punish criminals, while immigration detention is primarily rooted in
the sovereign power to control borders.214 The federal government’s power to
exclude foreigners whenever the public interest requires it is, in the words of
209

Id.
See Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 575 (7th Cir. 1976) (arguing that “a distinction must be made
between those activities of prison personnel which partake of the governmental role of a prison system and
those remaining activities which flow inexorably from the fact of confinement,” such as providing food and
“other incidentals”).
211
Professor Sharon Dolovich draws a distinction between these types of prison-related functions, noting
that virtually every corrections facility in the country contracts out to for-profit providers for some services,
such as food service and dental care, and acknowledges that services like garbage collection can be carried out
without having an impact on prisoners. See Dolovich, supra note 11, at 507–08.
212
See Investigation into Private Prisons Reveals Crowding, Under-Staffing and Inmate Deaths, supra
note 8.
213
See Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 44 (2010).
214
See MARK DOW, AMERICAN GULAG: INSIDE U.S. IMMIGRATION PRISONS 9 (2004); Travis Silva,
Note, Toward a Constitutionalized Theory of Immigration Detention, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 227 (2012).
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Justice Field, “an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the
United States, as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the
Constitution.”215
Ultimately, however, the system for detaining immigrants awaiting
deportation or immigration proceedings is strikingly similar to the
imprisonment of criminals.216 The detention of both immigrants and criminals
manifests the power of the state to deprive a person of liberty in the name of
law enforcement.217 Border control sovereignty considerations have been
folded into criminal law as the line between criminal enforcement and
immigration control has become blurred in law, practice, and public
discourse.218 As a matter of real-world experience, life as a detainee is a lot
like life as a prison inmate.219 Most of the facilities that ICE uses to house
immigrant detainees “were built, and operate, as jails and prisons to confine
pre-trial and sentenced felons.”220 Federal sourcing policy recognizes the
similarity of these functions by treating them as a single category.221
The power to imprison criminals and the power to detain immigrants are
both rooted in sovereignty.222 To the extent that immigration detention is
conceptually different from the imprisonment of criminals, it is still an
inherently governmental function under the nature of the function test because
it is based on the sovereign authority to deprive individuals of liberty.
C. Nature of the Function Analysis in Case Law
The conclusion that operating prison and detention facilities is an
inherently governmental function by its nature is supported by case law. Case
law provides a rich source of analysis with respect to the concept of inherently

215

Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
See DOW, supra note 214, at 17.
217
The “life, liberty, or property” provision of the FAIR Act applies to all private persons, not only to
U.S. citizens. 31 U.S.C. § 501 note (2012) (Federal Activities Inventory Reform).
218
Scholars have coined the term “crimmigration” to draw attention to this trend. See Bosworth &
Kaufman, supra note 35, at 440; Kalhan, supra note 213, at 42.
219
Kateel & Shahani, supra note 9, at 263–64 (stating that detainees “are treated no differently than
prisoners”).
220
DORA SCHRIRO, HOMELAND SEC.: IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, IMMIGRATION
DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2009).
221
The Circular specifies that it does not prevent contracting out for “the operation of prison or detention
facilities.” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 10.
222
See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 607 (1889) (“The
control of the people within its limits, and the right to expel from its territory persons who are dangerous to the
peace of the State, are too clearly within the essential attributes of sovereignty to be seriously contested.”).
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governmental functions and the nature of prisons. Courts have wrestled with
the question of whether functions are inherently or essentially governmental in
contexts such as the state action doctrine and municipal immunity. Despite the
lack of coherence in this line of cases regarding what makes a function
governmental, several themes emerge, including a consideration of the degree
to which an activity is necessary for the public good and a reliance on history
and tradition. Under most of the tests courts have developed to determine
whether a function is governmental, operating a prison or detention facility is
deemed inherently governmental. Courts have consistently characterized
prison and detention facilities as “traditionally,” “inherently,” or
“prototypically” governmental when they have had occasion to consider these
functions.223
Disputes involving the inherently governmental function standard of the
Circular have produced a handful of published cases.224 For example, in
Arrowhead Metals, Ltd. v. United States, a prospective offeror challenged the
U.S. Mint’s cancellation of the solicitation of bids for a contract relating to
coin production.225 The court held that the cancellation was valid because the
coinage of money is an inherently governmental function that cannot be
delegated to the private sector.226 The court identified the coinage of money as
an inherently governmental function based on the constitutional provision that
gives “Congress the power ‘To coin money.’”227 Constitutional grants of
power constitute one basis courts have relied on to identify inherently
governmental functions. Although there is no explicit constitutional grant of
the power to imprison individuals, it seems reasonable to conclude that if
coinage is an inherently governmental function, then prisons are also, given
that law enforcement is a more significant exercise of sovereignty under
current liberal assumptions.
A second context in which courts have addressed the inherently
governmental nature of certain functions is litigation involving public
functions under the state action doctrine. The state action doctrine is the
principle that the Fourteenth Amendment restricts only state and local
223
See, e.g., Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 416 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (enforcing stateimposed confinement is a “prototypically governmental function”); Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 575
(7th Cir. 1976) (stating matters involving discipline and security of inmates are “inherently governmental”);
Jordan v. Mills, 473 F. Supp. 13, 18 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (stating prison administration is an “unambiguous
example[] of a traditional governmental function”).
224
See LUCKEY ET AL., supra note 15, at 20–21, 21 n.19.
225
Arrowhead Metals, Ltd. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 703 (1985).
226
Id. at 717.
227
Id. at 706 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5).
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governments, not private conduct.228 The state action doctrine places no
constraints on privatization; rather, “it ‘constitutionalizes’ after-the-fact
delegations that amount to the exercise of public authority.”229 When a private
party performs a traditionally exclusive public function, its performance of this
function is treated as state action.230 The public function test ensures that when
a private party exercises powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the state,
it is subject to the Constitution to the same extent as the government.231
Because the public function test is used similarly to the nature of the function
test for inherently governmental functions, it is useful to consider these state
action cases to identify what functions the FAIR Act removes from federal
contracting.
The private prison context has proved an important application of the
traditionally exclusive public function test. Circuit courts have held that private
prisons and the wardens and guards who work there are state actors for the
purposes of constitutional rights because operating a prison is a traditionally
exclusively governmental function. In Street v. Corrections Corporation of
America, an inmate brought a § 1983 action against a private detention facility,
a warden, and a corrections officer.232 The Sixth Circuit applied the public
function test to determine whether the private conduct was fairly attributable to
the state.233 The court concluded that because the defendants were exercising
“powers which [were] traditionally exclusively reserved to the state,”234 they
were “acting under color of state law” and liable for violating the constitutional
rights of inmates just as government employees would be.235
As Justice Scalia stated in Richardson v. McKnight—dissenting on a
different point236—employees of private prison management firms “perform a
228

See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17–18 (1883).
Verkuil, supra note 12, at 431.
230
See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (citing examples of traditionally
exclusive public functions such as elections).
231
See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506–510 (1946) (concluding that a private company, in owning
and operating a town, fell into the category of “performing a public function,” and was therefore subject to
constitutional limits).
232
Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996).
233
Id. at 814.
234
Id. (quoting Ellison v. Garbarino, 48 F.3d 192, 195 (6th Cir. 1995)).
235
Id. (quoting Hicks v. Frey, 992 F.2d 1450, 1458 (6th Cir. 1993)).
236
The issue in Richardson v. McKnight was whether guards employed by private prison companies are
entitled to the same qualified immunity from § 1983 liability that is available to their public counterparts.
Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 402 (1997). The majority held that they were not. Id. Justice Scalia’s
dissent argued that they should be. Id. at 414 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia’s argument was based on
his view—not disputed by the majority—that prison guards, whether public or private, were performing a
public function and exercising a sovereign power. Id. at 416.
229
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prototypically governmental function”: the deprivation of liberty by the
state.237 Justice Scalia based this conclusion on the exercise of sovereign
power:
The duty of punishing criminals is inherent in the Sovereign power.
It may be committed to agencies selected for that purpose, but such
agencies, while engaged in that duty, stand so far in the place of the
State and exercise its political authority, and do not act in any private
capacity.238

Justice Scalia’s reasoning shows that the public function test has prompted
inherent-type analysis as well as historical analysis. It emphasizes the
governmental nature of the function of operating a prison rather than the
historical fact of privately operated prisons in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.
In Giron v. Corrections Corporation of America, a district court
acknowledged that correctional functions have never been exclusively public,
citing Richardson v. McKnight, but concluded that this fact did not mean “that
the extent of the governmental nature of the function is any less.”239 Because
only the government is empowered to incarcerate a citizen and the corrections
officer was performing a traditional state function when he checked on an
inmate in her cell, the court found the corrections officer was a state actor.240
The court focused on the officer’s exercise of his “coercive authority,” which
allowed him to gain access to the inmate and sexually abuse her.241 The public
function doctrine protects constitutional rights by holding private parties
accountable when they are exercising powers that have traditionally been
exclusively reserved to the state, such as the powers involved in managing
prisoners.
Municipal immunity is a third context involving a governmental function
inquiry. Historically, the doctrine of municipal immunity protected cities from
tort liability when they were engaged in a “governmental” function, while
leaving cities liable for injuries caused in furtherance of “proprietary”
functions.242 This distinction proved difficult for courts to apply.243 Attempts to

237
238

Id.
Id. at 417 (quoting Alamango v. Bd. of Supervisors of Albany Cty., 32 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 551, 552

(1881)).
239
240
241
242

Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1249 (D.N.M. 1998).
Id.
Id. at 1251.
See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 644–45 (1980).
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apply the governmental-proprietary distinction resulted in inconsistent
conclusions regarding functions such as education, provision of electricity,
sewers, and the maintenance of streets.244 Although tests differed by
jurisdiction, one common approach was to identify a function as governmental
if it was either “(1) essential or necessary for the government to perform, or (2)
traditional for the government to perform.”245 For example, the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts reasoned that a municipality should be answerable for acts
that are not necessary and are “voluntarily undertaken for its own profit and
commercial in character,” including in the proprietary category the
maintenance of highways and street lighting because such acts protected the
municipality’s “pecuniary interest growing out of statutory liability for
defects” in these municipal systems.246 By contrast, the Supreme Court of
Vermont found that bike paths are governmental, resulting in municipal
immunity.247 Typically, in the absence of a satisfactory test, courts analogize
the function at issue to a function that had already been deemed to be either
governmental or proprietary.248 Examples of activities consistently held to be
governmental functions in the municipal liability context include fire
departments and jails.249
Lastly, litigation under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) has involved
identifying uniquely governmental functions. The FTCA waives sovereign
immunity for claims against the United States “under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”250 In other
words, the government’s liability depends on whether it would have been
liable if it were a private person. Where there is no private analogue, liability
does not arise under the FTCA.251 In a case in which a federal prisoner brought
an action against the federal government under the FTCA, the Second Circuit
found that the tort of wrongful confinement lacks a private analogue.252 The
243
This distinction has been almost universally condemned because of the lack of satisfactory test.
Spencer v. Gen. Hosp. of D.C., 425 F.2d 479, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
244
Id.
245
Nw. Nat. Gas Co. v. City of Portland, 711 P.2d 119, 125 (Or. 1985) (in banc).
246
Bolster v. City of Lawrence, 114 N.E. 722, 723–24 (Mass. 1917).
247
Gretkowski v. City of Burlington, 50 F. Supp. 2d 292, 296 (D. Vt. 1998).
248
See id. (concluding that bike paths are like public parks and highways).
249
See, e.g., Shaw v. City of Charleston, 50 S.E. 527 (W. Va. 1905) (discussing jails); Mendel & Co. v.
City of Wheeling, 28 W. Va. 233, 246–48 (1886) (discussing fire departments).
250
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012).
251
See McGowan v. United States, 825 F.3d 118, 127–28 (2nd Cir. 2016). Notwithstanding the lack of
private analogue, the Supreme Court has concluded that prisoners may sue under the FTCA on the basis of
Congressional intent as revealed by legislative history. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 153–58 (1963).
252
McGowan, 825 F.3d at 126.
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court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that private contractors operating
detention facilities could provide the private analogue because
“[p]rivate persons cannot establish facilities to detain other persons—only the
government can, either on its own or through a governmental contractor.”253
Additionally, lower courts have found that there is no private analogue to
prison rules and regulations.254
These areas of case law illustrate that the distinction between governmental
functions and non-governmental functions has long proved a thorny issue
across various contexts. There is no unifying, coherent test for identifying what
is a governmental function and what is not. Courts have looked to
constitutional grants of power, history, tradition, the nature of a function, and
the degree to which a function is necessary for the public good. However, it is
safe to say that under most, if not all, of the judicial tests for governmental
functions, the operation of prisons qualifies. Courts have consistently found
that imprisoning private individuals is inherently governmental.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The legality of private federal prisons and detention facilities is particularly
important to reconsider at the current historical moment. The Trump
Administration’s aggressive approach to law enforcement, its favorable
attitude toward privatization, and the projected increase in the federal prison
and detention populations make the proper administrative designation of prison
and detention services an urgent question.255
Recognizing the detention of prisoners and immigrants as an inherently
governmental function that is off-limits to contracting—as this Comment
argues the law requires—would have significant implications for the fate of
facilities operated by private, for-profit contractors. This designation would
require the federal government to recommit to the DOJ’s 2016 decision to
phase out the federal government’s practice of contracting with private prison

253
254

Id. at 127.
See, e.g., Fiore v. Medina, No. 11 Civ. 2264 RJS, 2012 WL 4767143, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27,

2012).
255
See AMES C. GRAWERT & NATASHA CAMHI, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
PRESIDENT TRUMP’S FIRST 100 DAYS (describing the Trump Administration’s revival of the “tough on crime”
approach to criminal justice); Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions III, supra note 3; ICE ERO
Immigration Arrests Climb Nearly 40%, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/
features/100-days (last visited Sept. 26, 2017); Burnett, supra note 3 (quoting President Trump’s statement that
privatization of prisons “seems to work a lot better”).
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companies.256 Perhaps even more importantly, this designation would prohibit
private contractors from operating federal immigration detention facilities.
Given the dramatic growth in the number of individuals detained by
immigration authorities in recent decades,257 the high proportion of ICE
detainees in privately operated facilities,258 and the likelihood of further growth
in the population of immigrant detainees under the Trump Administration,259 a
prohibition on contracting with private companies for detention services would
impede the government’s current immigration enforcement operations and
create an urgent need to reform the system of immigration detention.
Ensuring that the federal government’s procurement decisions are
consistent with the law is a desirable end in itself, especially at a moment when
the rule of law appears threatened.260 But a legality-based argument that the
FAIR Act requires the federal government to end the practice of private prison
contracting does not address the merits of the statute or provide arguments
against repealing it.261 In response to the argument that the operation of prison
and detention facilities is an inherently governmental function that cannot be
contracted out to the private sector, Congress could simply choose to repeal or
modify the FAIR Act’s prohibition on contracting out inherently governmental
functions.
However, in arguing that prison and immigration detention is inherently
governmental under both the exercise of discretion test and the nature of the
function test, this Comment has suggested why the inherently governmental
function law is valuable from a social and policy perspective. The exercise of
discretion test for inherently governmental functions is designed to prevent
private contractors from performing functions that involve substantial
discretion in applying government authority. This accomplishes desirable
policy goals such as maintaining democratic accountability and preventing
256

See Yates Memorandum, supra note 1.
The number of people annually detained by immigration authorities increased fivefold between 1995
and 2013. Donald Kerwin, Detention of Newcomers: Constitutional Standards and New Legislation: Part One,
IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Nov. 1996, at 1, 1 (stating that there were roughly 85,000 detainees in 1995); JOHN F.
SIMANSKI, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS:
2013 5 (2014) (showing 440,557 detainees in 2013).
258
See HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 5.
259
See James Surowiecki, Trump Sets Private Prisons Free, NEW YORKER (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2016/12/05/trump-sets-private-prisons-free.
260
See Joan Biskupic, Trump’s Disdain for the Rule of Law, CNN (July 26, 2017, 8:33 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/26/politics/trump-rule-of-law/index.html.
261
See Volokh, supra note 4, at 158–59 (“A legality-based argument of this sort obviously says nothing
about whether the law at issue is a good idea. Therefore, it doesn’t provide us with any arguments against
repealing the law.”).
257
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abuses of discretion. As Columbia law professor David Pozen has observed,
riots and the abuse of inmates are “indicative of the risks of contracting”
because “with for-profit operators, a prison can quickly degenerate when its
management is determined to save money by cutting corners and the
government does not intervene.”262 The inmate riots at Reeves County
Detention Center stand as a vivid reminder that private companies do cut
corners to reduce costs (in that case, by doing away with minimum staffing
requirements) and that excessive discretion to cut costs can have especially
disastrous consequences in the prison context.263 Because a private prison
contractor exercises discretion with significant consequences for the conditions
and duration of an inmate’s confinement, the operation of prison and detention
facilities is an inherently governmental function under the exercise of
discretion test.
Furthermore, the nature of the function test for inherently governmental
functions is valuable because it tends to bring federal procurement policy into
alignment with widely held, deeply rooted beliefs about state power.264 The
FAIR Act reflects the intuitive view that it is inappropriate to treat certain core
government functions—notably those significantly affecting the life, liberty, or
property of individuals—as commercial activities to be performed for profit.265
The statute’s prohibition on contracting out inherently governmental functions
is a well-established principle upheld by four administrations, both Republican
and Democratic.266 To the extent that American society is committed to a
liberal vision of sovereign power, individual liberty, and the functions of
government, this theory implies that there are some functions that would be
inappropriate for non-state actors to perform.
Thus, the federal government should end the practice of contracting with
private companies to operate prison and detention facilities not only because
compliance with the law is desirable as a general matter, but also because the

262

Pozen, supra note 117, at 282.
See supra notes 114–16.
264
See supra Section III.B.1.
265
See Harel & Porat, supra note 199.
266
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 10; OFFICE OF MGMT.
& BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-76 REVISED, PERFORMANCE OF
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES (1983); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB
CIRCULAR NO. A-76 REVISED, POLICIES FOR ACQUIRING COMMERCIAL OR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS AND
SERVICES NEEDED BY THE GOVERNMENT (1979); BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BULL. NO. 55-4, COMMERCIAL-INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDING PRODUCTS OR
SERVICES FOR GOVERNMENTAL USE (1955) (distinguishing between commercial activities and noncommercial
“management responsibilities of a Government agency”).
263
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FAIR Act’s prohibition on contracting out inherently governmental functions
is a desirable law. The FAIR Act and the tests the OMB has developed to
identify inherently governmental functions should inform the nation’s ongoing
debate about the privatization of various functions and the proper role of the
government.267
CONCLUSION
The legality of privately operated federal prison and detention facilities
hinges on whether the operation of these facilities is an inherently
governmental function that is off-limits to contracting under the FAIR Act.268
The operation of prison and detention facilities is an inherently governmental
function if it meets either the exercise of discretion test or the nature of the
function test.269
This Comment argued that operating prison and detention facilities is an
inherently governmental function, and therefore cannot be performed by
private contractors. It showed that prison and detention facilities are an
inherently governmental function under either of the two tests the federal
government developed to guide its outsourcing decisions. A function could be
off-limits to contracting based on the exercise of discretion test alone, or the
nature of the function test alone. That the operation of prison and detention
facilities fails both tests underscores the urgent need to end the practice of
contracting out for these services. Phasing out private prisons as the Obama
Administration proposed would bring the federal government’s practice into
conformance with its own policies and, more importantly, the law.
The FAIR Act embodies values as well as dry rules of federal procurement,
including the belief that executing the laws to significantly affect the life,
liberty, or property of private individuals is the exclusive province of the

267
See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Down the Mighty Columbia River, Where a Power Struggle Looms, N.Y.
TIMES (July 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/07/28/us/columbia-river-privatization.
html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=second-column-region&
region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news.
268
31 U.S.C. § 501 note (2012) (Federal Activities Inventory Reform).
269
Policy Letter 11-01 supra note 16, at 56,237–38.
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government. Ending the federal government’s reliance on private prison and
detention facilities accords not only with a legal distinction in the FAIR Act
but also with the values that animate it.
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